Problems about Scientific Explanation Essay -- Van Fraassen Scientific

Problems just about Scientific ExplanationHave you ever thought about the way your car works? The inner works of the engine, how does the fuel realise it work, how does combustion lead to movement and is then passed to the wheels? If you have, what ar you going to dissolvent an 8-year-old kid when he asks Why does the car move? Are you going to bring forth explaining high school physics, mechanics, chemistry of combustion and the concept of friction? Or are you just going to say Well, the car eats up gas, and that makes the engine move the wheels. Granted, the latter doesnt explain much about what a car is. But it answers the question by the kids understanding, doesnt it? The question is answered, the kid is happy, and you did non have to spend a few weeks introducing what you just said. Some may argue that this is misleading, but despite the fact that when viewed generally, the simple answer big businessman seem false or incomplete, in the context of the situation, it is qui te adequate. That is what wagon train Fraassen is trying to say with regard to scientific explanation.According to him, there are two problems about scientific explanation. Both are very slow seen in our example. The first is, when is something explained? Some argue that we should not explain a phenomenon unless we have the full, unifying, true-to-the-last-miniscule-detail explanation, which will also cover all the cases which correspond to our case, cases equal to our case, or distant variants of our case. In short, what they want is a theory of everything, which in itself is a noble goal, but is hardy achievable. Lets face it, everything in our beingness is connected in one way or another, or with one another, to everything else in it. A man bears definite connection to, for instance, gas giant figure of planets. A reason for that could be, for example, that both share some mutual chemic elements. Does that mean that same theory should apply to prediction of mans movement as to a gas giant movement? As ridiculous as it sounds, this type of proposition often arises in science, though not as grotesque, but nevertheless as distant, for example, Theory of Relativity and the Quantum Theory. If a tike would have been told to expect the same behavior from and ant and from and elephant, he would be quite confused. How do we then expect gigantic objects to obey the same rules as microscopic ones? W... ...yone would go into the chemical components causing the green seeming of the apples skin, unless asked about it. Demonstrations, however, are proofs, and while also answering why questions, relate the causes to the upshot of the phenomena, otherwise the proof is incomplete. A good example of this distinction would be the application of a simple logic rule (also known as De Morgan law), that (A and B) is (A or B) and vice versa. We can say that (P and Q) is (P or Q) because of De Morgan law, and that is sufficient for an explanation. Yet, if we were to rigo rously demonstrate this without any initial assumptions, we would have to corroborate De Morgan law while at it, or our proof would be incomplete. To conclude, forefront Fraassens idea of explanation is that which has no place in purely suppositional science, as he rejects the truth of theories as well ass their magic spell to essence. An explanations domain, according to him, is to be adequate in the context chosen by pragmatic factors, which are derived from the why question the explanation is called to answer. Surely, van Fraassen would not doubt for a second what to answer the kid who asked what is the reason his car moves.